{"id":1615,"date":"2026-04-02T18:28:01","date_gmt":"2026-04-02T18:28:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2026\/04\/02\/world-war-trade-cepr\/"},"modified":"2026-04-02T18:28:01","modified_gmt":"2026-04-02T18:28:01","slug":"world-war-trade-cepr","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2026\/04\/02\/world-war-trade-cepr\/","title":{"rendered":"World War Trade | CEPR"},"content":{"rendered":"

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World War Trade<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n

(Tim Phillips talks to Richard Baldwin about his new CEPR Press book)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

World trade had been weaponized as it has never been in peacetime.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

As wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe grab our attention, there’s another conflict that threatens to cause just as much economic pain. It is what my guest today calls „World War Trade”.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The entire world is reacting to this weaponization.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

So today on VoxTalks Economics, the new geopolitics of trade and where the world’s trading order goes from here. Welcome to VoxTalks Economics from the Centre for Economic Policy Research. I’m Tim Phillips. Now, if this sounds like your kind of episode, stick with us and pass it on to someone who’ll find it useful. Richard Baldwin of IMD Business School, and of course the founder of VoxEU and a former president of CEPR, among other things, is the author of World War Trade, a new book from CEPR Press, which tells the story of the collapse of the global trading system. Ahead of the book’s launch, I spoke to him about how we got into this mess, what the consequences are for countries caught in the crossfire between the US and China, and what comes next. Richard, great to talk to you again.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Lovely to be here. Thanks for having me.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Are we really in world war trade, like your title says? No one’s declared war. How would we know if we were in a world war for trade?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Well, let’s put it this way. If the tariffs that Donald Trump put on the world on April 2nd were missiles instead of tariffs, there would be no question whatsoever that this was World War III. And the next day, China put export controls on the entire world. So by the end of the first week of April, world trade had been weaponized as it has never been in peace time. The other thing I want to stress with this world war trade is it did have, like all wars, a big moment, a Pearl Harbor or a blitzkrieg moment when it started, but there was a lot behind it. And not only are there U.S. terrorists and Chinese export controls, but the entire world is reacting to this weaponization. by screening investments and controlling who gets to buy companies and worrying about intellectual property, right? Who gets the patents and things. So basically trade flipped from being safe to being dangerous. And that’s what I want to strike is that we’re in a world now where there may not be active missiles flying around, but you still have to be careful. Also, it sounded cool. So, you know, that was the title.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

As you say, there’s a lot behind it. And I think that’s what’s behind your declaration at the beginning that the war was a shock, but not a surprise. Now, I was pretty surprised by it. A lot of people I know were pretty surprised by it. You were not surprised. Why not?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

I was very much surprised by the extent of it and the lack of preparation and that. But you remember, he spent the entire campaign saying he would put tariffs on everybody. He said repeatedly, 10% on everyone, 60% on China. Unless you weren’t listening, you knew he was going to put tariffs on. Then in February, he put 25% on Canada and Mexico and China. Those are the three largest trading partners. And then in March, he put tariffs on everybody for steel and autos. So by the time April started, April 1st came along, he had already done quite a lot. He’d already taco’d on many things and backed off. But by the end of March, he was thinking trade wars are good and easy to win. And so it was shocking how far he went. I don’t know how closely you followed the thing, but markets, for example, he did it after markets closed and markets closed up that day because they were thinking that it would all be theater and nothing dramatic. And when he announced it, as soon as he brought that poster board up onto the thing, this famous picture that everybody’s seen, the future markets, which were open, started plummeting. First of all, they were totally weird tariffs. What’s going on? Russia didn’t get any tariffs, for example. So I was surprised by that. But the idea that Trump was channeling the grievance of the American middle class and using tariffs to blame foreign for that, that wasn’t a surprise. And really, the first part of the book is talking about how\u00a0 America went from John F. Kennedy’s American exceptionalism, leading the trading system to make the world safe for the American way of life, all the way to Donald Trump, where he says foreigners, including our closest allies, had been pillaging America on trade. So I take that journey. And then the same thing was true on China. So China has always had people retaliating against them, and they’ve always been relatively moderate about it. And for example, in March, they retaliated in a normal way. In April, they put tariffs on everybody with these very severe, very precise controls. So I tell the story of how China actually got to the point where they could not tolerate Trump’s bullying in the same way they had tolerated it back in his first term. So that’s explaining how we got here.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

As you say, Trump tacos from time to time – it stands for Trump always chickens out. We think of that in terms of him applying tariffs and then taking them off again. And we also think of tariffs as the weapon in world war trade. Is it the only weapon? Is it even the main weapon that’s being used?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

For the US, that’s what Donald Trump loves, and that’s basically the only thing he’s using. There was before, under Biden, restrictions on exporting semiconductor technology, and the US does have some export controls. But the main weapons here are the US tariffs on everybody and Chinese export controls on everybody. So I think those are the main weapons. But lots of other countries are adopting rules, like the EU is adopting the anti-coercion instrument, Lots of countries are changing the rules so they can counter coercion in a way that doesn’t fit neatly into the usual dumping anti-subsidy kind of thing.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Some might flinch at the idea of calling this a war because, of course, we are involved in many regional conflicts at the moment. The most significant, as we record, are in Iran and Ukraine. Is this all part of the same general level of heightened conflict we have, or can we separate the trade wars and the military wars?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

I’m really not very qualified to talk about military engagement stuff. I read the newspaper like everybody else. But what I can say with that is that the fundamental idea that the U.S. has stepped back as a hegemon, this is what Ian Bremmer calls the G-Zero world. So the U.S., after the wall fell, was the sole hegemon on everything. But the U.S. voluntarily started from really Obama… stepping back from leadership of the economy. And so then the whole world became more like 3D chess. And parts of that are that regional conflicts are kicking up in ways that they wouldn’t have before. So, for example, when Russia shut off Ukrainian wheat going through the Black Sea, and that caused hunger in the Mediterranean, it was Turkey and Russia who sat down and did the deal to open it up, not the United States. And also right before Gaza, it was Saudi Arabia and Israel sitting down to do a deal. In the old days, that would have been at Camp David. The fact that the US had withdrawn is putting us a little bit more into this chaos world where nobody’s really in charge of everything. So the U.S. is still a hegemon on finance and military and security affairs. But because they had stepped back, I think the world has become a more conflictual place and less coordinated than it was when the U.S. was in charge. By the way, I see what Trump is doing in Iran, and it’s exactly how he did his tariffs.\u00a0 The whole pretending that the foreigners wanted to negotiate, making up calls, and all that.\u00a0 He did that with tariffs and he’s doing exactly the same thing with the conduct of Iran, and that he goes out,\u00a0 no plan B, didn’t really seriously consider the consequences, even though they were obvious. It’s very, very familiar what he’s doing. Big difference, though, is you can take tariffs off and people don’t die, but it’s similar.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Intermission<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

This is a fast-moving story, and it has only been a couple of months since we last spoke to Richard, along with Gene Grossman of Princeton, to catch up on 2025’s seismic moves in trade. Listen to our episode, ‘What’s Next for Trump’s Tariffs’, broadcast in January 2026, when you subscribe, wherever you get your podcasts.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Very often, financial markets seem to have underreacted to the events. They seem to be looking through what’s going on and hoping for a time at which the war de-escalates, in the jargon that we use now. Are the policymakers in China and the United States taking a similar sort of short-term view that this is a war that goes on for a short time and then we all get back to normal?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The financial markets, let’s take that one first.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Yeah.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

And it’s got to do with this taco, which you said, that was invented after. So when Trump came out with April 2nd, the markets went haywire. And for seven days, the stock price fell: It was one of the largest falls that’s been. Ever. The dollar was falling instead of rising, the Treasury bill was going up. So things were really going haywire and starting to look like there could be a financial sector meltdown. And then Trump put the tariffs actually in effect on April 9th at midnight, and about noon, he took them off, suspended them all. And that was an enormous relief to markets. Now, then he was trying to explain what he was doing and they didn’t have a plan B. They didn’t have a communication strategy. So there was conflicting things. Some people said, oh, it was all part of the plan and they were just trying to build up part of the deal kind of leverage. And others said, you know, look, the markets were falling apart, he had to back down. And the markets eventually came to believe that he backed down because he wanted to avoid the market chaos. And what that meant was that the markets had a floor under them. And what was really flipping them out on April 9th is, maybe there’s no floor for this thing. Who knows what it’s going to be again. Could be another 2008. But once he taco’d because of financial markets, the financial markets said, well, you know, he’s crazy. He’ll do crazy things, make it sound good, but he won’t actually let the world fall apart. And then once that possible hit is taken off the table, the whole rest of the positive story on AI and US growth and deregulation and fiscal stimulus, that all took over. So the markets then expected him to back off, even when he did things that were bold and silly. So I think that’s why the markets didn’t react. Now, for the U.S. and China, I don’t think anybody in the U.S. thinks this is a short-term thing. I can’t imagine an American presidential candidate, no matter from which party, in 2028 saying, okay, you know those tariffs, we’ll just take them off. Let’s go back to liking free trade. That’s just not going to happen. In China, I do not think will remove their export controls. So their controls are not applied. It’s a system of permits. And they just play with the flow of the permits to have leverage. And by and large, they’re not cutting off the flow too much. If no other reason, they don’t want other people to make these things. So I think they both are planning to keep their main weapons online. We were talking about the title before. If I could have figured out a way to say, ‘the trade cold war’, or ‘cold war trade’, something like that, that probably would have been more apt.\u00a0 Because that’s what we’re in now: we’re in a cold war. We have two countries with these two very large weapons.\u00a0 They’ve backed off – they’re no longer confronting each other at all,\u00a0 but I don’t think it’s ending. And countries, whether Japan, EU, Canada, Mexico, they’re all preparing for long-term, at least Cold War.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

And in this Cold War, can those other countries avoid taking sides?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

So far, yes. It’s a little puzzling that this didn’t spin out of control. So the first part, Trump actually lowered the effectiveness of his tariffs in order to avoid hurting the domestic things. So his tariffs weren’t as bad as many people think. Half of US imports are exempted, for instance, from these tariffs. So the headline tariffs look huge, but the actual applied tariffs are much lower. People didn’t react too much. The other thing is that I think China used its export controls to prevent anti-China coalitions from arising. And, most definitely, you could see that with the UK agreement: that the US was trying to get people to do anti-China things, as well as make concessions to the US they were going to do some, you know, strip China out of your supply chain.\u00a0 That was the kind of thing.\u00a0 But now that China has this against everybody, other countries are very reluctant to put anti-China things in it. So why that’s important, because in my May book, The Great Trade Hack, I had four scenarios,\u00a0 And one of them was that the world would break up into blocks and fragment. And the easiest way that would have happened is the US would have put up the big tariffs, the US would have encouraged other people to put tariffs against China, and then China would have retaliated not just against the US, but other countries. So we would have naturally split into China doing a US with lots of tariffs on everybody and people retaliating or not. But that’s how the world could have split up. But China, with its export controls, defended the multilateral system. Now, that’s somewhat controversial, but you’ve got to remember, China loves the rules-based multilateral system. Nobody’s done better than them. And even if they had to go back to Biden or even Trump one … they would take that deal in a second because that’s just a cost of doing business for them. So I think that they indirectly actually prevented the system from falling apart by blocking the most likely route to the world breaking up into blocks. And then the other countries, they sort of realized that retaliating against the US didn’t work. It was just exactly the opposite. It got him more mad than actually doing anything, and he didn’t seem to care about the retaliation. So the other countries showed restraint, and that also reduced the possibility of it breaking up.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Because of the ubiquity of trade, everybody has to trade. Even if you attempt neutrality, is it important that every policymaker in every country who has responsibility for trade has some response to this? They have to do something.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

What I think most of them have done is, first of all, they showed restraint by negotiating, not retaliating. I think you really only need to focus on about five or six economies because that accounts for most of the world trade. There’s 200 trading. The main ones, basically, they didn’t retaliate except China, and then that got taken off pretty much. Then they are worried that this… coercion could continue. So they are taking steps like, you know, maybe China is buying European companies that are then moving technology that Europe doesn’t want to go to China. So they’re screening that sort of thing. So they are taking actions. I call it building bunkers. So they are getting ready for this coercion by changing their domestic laws. They all have to have a view of it. And to me, the main thing, most encouraging, is most of them at least have pretended they continue to follow WTO rules, stretching them here and there a little bit. But nobody’s saying like the U.S. is we don’t care about WTO law.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

You quote President Clinton in the book, who said in the 90s that globalization was an economic force of nature, that it was inevitable. Was he being naive or did we all think that at that time?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Oh, no, I think it was very widely spread. I thought it was fairly inevitable. I do remember Kevin O’Rourke, who had written the book, you know, for two millennias of trade, always saying, look, you guys have no idea what you’re talking about. And to me, when I think back as to why I was wrong, it’s because we were taking too much of a flat earth view of what drove trade policy. And back then, trade policy was something that was not on the radar screens of voters. It was in the hands of lobbyists and congressmen and things like that. And it worked for most people. And it was good for the country. What changed was when the global financial crisis came around, the middle class who had been hurt by this started thinking the system was rigged and that they were victimized by an elite. Now, in the beginning, it was like, well, Occupy Wall Street, people blame Wall Street and the 1% they used to call it, but it was domestic. And then Trump channeled that into blaming foreigners for the problem, and then it was off. So once Trump was talking about tariffs in front of big audiences and people cheering, it was no longer the restraint of the political economy equilibrium that existed, but that supported free trade. It was people who really did not understand free trade, who did not understand that tariffs were a tax that it would actually hurt them. They understand that now. So, the whole thing got taken into the public sphere and therefore the equilibrium that existed that Clinton was talking about, that was blown apart by the change of the nature of discourse.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Kudos to Kevin O’Rourke, who has been correct on VoxTalks Economics more times than I can count. However, Richard, there is going to be a meeting between the United States and China. Donald Trump is on his way to China in a few weeks. And the reverse visit is going to happen later this year. Could this lead to an announcement of peace in our time, a reversion to the way things used to be? Is that too much to hope for?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Oh, it’s absolutely not going to happen. No, absolutely not. First of all, the only thing that Democrats and Republicans agree in Washington is that China is the problem. And so whatever Trump will say, there’ll be happy headlines, but there’s no way he can take off the aggressiveness against China inside the United States. And also in China, I think they would be quite happy to go back to the way it was before, but they also can’t be seen as being bullied. This whole century of humiliation and the opium war thing, that’s a real thing in China. And so they can’t see that go back. You know, right now they’ve fought to a stalemate. But what China has done is diverted a lot of their imports and exports away from the US, and the US has diverted a lot of their imports and exports away from China. So these two countries are disengaging in terms of how much they trade. And that’s, I think, where it’s going to go. But the violent part of it, if this was a war, it would be like the assaults. That’s ended. And now it’s North Korea, South Korea. They’re not going to make up and be friends, but they’re also not going to be sending over more missiles.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

But be a future historian for me. Your subhead talks of an emergent trading order, which to me assumes that there is a time when World War trade is over and the world decides to get on with trading just in a different way. What will this post-war consensus be?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Right. So the idea is that the world moves on, but without the US, and China’ll probably be a part of it. So here’s the idea. There are two or three very large regional trading agreements, the EU being by far the largest, but there’s one in Asia called CPTPP. It’s been working well for years. It’s rules-based. It has a lot of deep disciplines, and it does not involve American leadership. And it does not involve Chinese leadership. But both of those, EU and CPTP, survived World War trade. They’re working just fine. And you could have imagined that the kind of different treatment by the US could have led to tensions within these agreements, but it didn’t. So what I view these as sort of pools of predictability, its rules-based stability, and that, plus the fact that the U.S. has now shut off its market to a lot of people, made many countries interested in new regional trade liberalization. And I was just looking at the numbers now, the number of agreements that have been signed is quite impressive since World War Trade started. And many times, like with the EU with India or the EU with Mercosur, same with EU\/Australia, these are negotiations that have been lingering for years, and all of a sudden they said, well, look, we’re just going to have to make some compromises, get this over, because we want to diversify away from China and the US, and we want predictability. Once these things start, they create a gravitational force. When one country joins, that creates a greater cost of staying out and greater benefit of coming in. And I’ll give you one very specific example, which happened just a couple of weeks ago. EU has been negotiating with Mercosur and Australia for years. The main beef is beef. So there’s like, how much beef can we export to the EU? And the EU says not much. And Australia and Brazil go, well, you know, if there’s not much beef in this thing, we’re not going to sign. But eventually, this idea that Brazil really needs the stability of the EU market, and the EU is looking for stability with Mercosur, they got over the line, partially through geopolitics. But now once Brazil had the access to EU, the cost to Australia of continuing to play hard rose. So, Australia made the last concessions necessary to join. Now, as that happens, it creates a gravitational force that pulls in more people. That’s at one level. And at another level, as the world is weaponized and access is uncertain, rules-based trade groups like that become more attractive than before. And as more people join those rules, it becomes more attractive to join that rules club. Now, the interesting thing is, and this happened quite recently, is the EU and the CPTPP are talking about aligning. They have a dialogue going on now. And so if those two, they’re never going to join each other like the UK joined CPTPP, that won’t be a joining, but if they align, that is a very large share of world trade, which will be under these rules. And that will therefore attract even more people into it. So my vision of where we’re going is the WTO stays at low level. That’s for everybody. Everybody obeys those rules because the rules are in their national laws. And on top of it is this deeper – which involves investment and electric property and capital flows and all those things – that’s CPTPP and EU. That will create a sort of WTO 2.0 level where not everybody joins, but most of the major trading partners will join. There is a more shallow version of like the EU where it’s just free trade mostly, a little bit more. So the biggest one is called RCEP, which is, again, the words, it’s like regional comprehensive economic partnership. But it involves China and Japan, all the ASEAN. So it’s a very, very large chunk of world trade. And it is rules-based. So as long as China is playing by the rules, that could also enlarge, although people aren’t rushing to join that one. The new system is being rebuilt. There is no plan. It’s self-organizing. Once some country joins a regional trade agreement, that increases the forces for others to join, and you get regionalism spreading like wildfire. Now that same thing happened in the 90s, in the Western hemisphere, happened in the 2000s in Asia, so this an old story.\u00a0 Most people had forgotten about it. And that’s where I’m feeling optimistic that this system is rebuilding itself.\u00a0 The old system was like a cathedral, where the US was in charge, financed it, in charge of the maintenance, and keeping it going, and then the architect burned down the cathedral, and something else is being rebuilt, but without the architect. Maybe the US will come back in, but right now, I think we’re going to see more rules-based predictability, more integration, more liberalization, but just without the United States. Just to give you one fact, which you may or may not like, is that the world trade actually grew, pretty well, in 2025. And exports in all the countries except America grew. The United States, for instance, had the largest trade deficit ever in 2025. The system itself de facto is not falling apart. The tariffs of the whole rest of the world have not risen. It’s just the U.S. tariffs. It’s starting to look like the U.S. has decided to withdraw from the system, become a more closed economy. And the rest of the world moves on.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Well, it’s a dramatic, often scary and often confusing story, Richard. So thank you very much for writing the book that makes it less confusing, even if not always less scary.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Richard Baldwin<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Thank you.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Tim Phillips<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The book is called World War Trade, Conflict, Containment and the Emergent World Trading Order. Richard Baldwin. It is number six in the Rapid Response Economics series from CEPR and is, of course, a free download.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Outro<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

VoxTalks Economics is a Talk Normal production. The assistant producer is Megan Bieber and our editor is Andrei Zagarian. Next time on VoxTalks Economics, we mark the launch of the Paris Report on global imbalances with a series of podcasts on how we can rebalance the global economy.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Nuoroda \u012f informacijos \u0161altin\u012f <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

World War Trade (Tim Phillips talks to Richard Baldwin about his new CEPR Press book) Richard Baldwin World trade had been weaponized as it has never been in peacetime. \u00a0 Tim Phillips As wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe grab our attention, there’s another conflict that threatens to cause just as much economic…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[360,1406,3421,3103],"class_list":["post-1615","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-pasaulio-ekonomikos-naujienos","tag-cepr","tag-trade","tag-war","tag-world"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1615","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1615"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1615\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1615"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1615"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1615"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}