{"id":1519,"date":"2025-09-04T18:06:33","date_gmt":"2025-09-04T18:06:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/"},"modified":"2025-09-04T18:06:33","modified_gmt":"2025-09-04T18:06:33","slug":"europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s trade surplus, international relative prices, and the productivity growth gap"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><\/p>\n<div>\n<p>Since the early 2000s, the euro area has faced a persistent growth challenge. Output and productivity growth in the region have remained below those of global competitors such as the US and China. Over the same period, the euro area has maintained a sustained trade surplus, averaging 2.6% of GDP. This was accompanied by rising trade openness and a trendless real exchange rate (RER).<\/p>\n<p>Some interpret the positive euro area trade balance as evidence of deficient domestic demand, particularly weak investment (e.g. Bernanke 2015, Kollmann et al. 2016, 2017, Demertzis 2024, Sandbu 2024, IMF 2025, OECD 2025). Others highlight structural factors such as demographics (Kollmann et al. 2015) as well as strong trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world (Chen et al. 2013). Recently, Draghi (2024) argued that weak Single Market integration and shallow capital markets suppress investment, tilting growth toward external demand and sustaining surpluses.<\/p>\n<p>Most of the existing long-standing literature on euro imbalances has focused on internal adjustment within the euro area (see, for example, Zeugner and Hobza 2013, Fadinger et al. 2023, and the survey among economists conducted by Reis et al. 2016). Several studies have stressed the role of resource misallocation (Gopinath et al. 2017) and financial market imperfections (Kollmann et al. 2016, Jaccard and Smets 2020, Ozhan 2020) in explaining weak demand in the euro area particularly after the financial and sovereign debt crises.<\/p>\n<p>In a new study (Ifrim et al. 2025), we revisit these dynamics using an estimated DSGE model that allows for persistent (trend) shocks to productivity and trade structure. By departing from the common assumption of transitory disturbances, this framework quantifies the long-run forces of external adjustment. Our key finding is that the euro area\u2019s persistent productivity growth gap vis-\u00e0-vis the rest of the world (RoW) has been a central driver of the trade surplus. Trade structure shocks \u2013 particularly declining euro area home bias and falling import prices \u2013 also play a critical role by offsetting appreciation pressures on the RER.<\/p>\n<p>Our findings highlight that Europe\u2019s persistent trade surplus and weak investment are rooted not only in domestic demand conditions but also in long-standing productivity gaps and structural shifts in global trade. Our analysis thus supports recent calls for renewed reform efforts to strengthen productivity and enhance the region\u2019s resilience to global shocks.<\/p>\n<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_82_2 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\" style=\"cursor:inherit\">Turinys;<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Global_growth_gaps_and_European_adjustment\" >Global growth gaps and European adjustment<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Notes_Based_on_World_Bank_Development_Indicators_WDI_2025_The_dashed_lines_represent_trend_growth_rates_computed_as_Hodrick-Prescott_HP_trends_of_the_respective_YoY_growth_rates\" >Notes: Based on World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2025). The dashed lines represent trend growth rates, computed as Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trends of the respective YoY growth rates.<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Notes_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_euro_The_RER_is_measured_as_relative_GDP_deflators_and_expressed_as_a_percentage_deviation_from_its_2010_level\" >Notes: A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the euro. The RER is measured as relative GDP deflators and expressed as a percentage deviation from its 2010 level.<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#A_model_with_trend_shocks\" >A model with trend shocks<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#The_productivity_gap_as_a_driver_of_the_trade_balance_and_RER\" >The productivity gap as a driver of the trade balance and RER<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Notes_The_coloured_bars_show_contributions_of_key_shocks_to_the_trade-balance-to-GDP_ratio_and_the_RER_solid_lines_show_the_data_Bars_above_the_solid_horizontal_line_represent_positive_shock_contributions_while_bars_below_show_negative_shock_contributions_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_euro\" >Notes: The coloured bars show contributions of key shocks to the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio and the RER; solid lines show the data. Bars above the solid horizontal line represent positive shock contributions, while bars below show negative shock contributions. A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the euro.<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Notes_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_Euro\" >Notes: A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the Euro.<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#Policy_implications\" >Policy implications<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/2025\/09\/04\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-the-productivity-growth-gap\/#References\" >References<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Global_growth_gaps_and_European_adjustment\"><\/span>Global growth gaps and European adjustment<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>Between 1999 and 2023, real GDP in the euro area grew by only 1.26% per year on average, compared to 3.28% in the RoW. The gap in labour productivity growth \u2013 measured as GDP per person in the labour force \u2013 is similarly stark: 0.70% per year in the euro area versus 1.95% in RoW (Figure 1). These differentials are not a short-run phenomenon: The growth gap is highly persistent and is projected to continue.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 1<\/strong> GDP per capita growth rates<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Notes_Based_on_World_Bank_Development_Indicators_WDI_2025_The_dashed_lines_represent_trend_growth_rates_computed_as_Hodrick-Prescott_HP_trends_of_the_respective_YoY_growth_rates\"><\/span><em>Notes<\/em>: Based on World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2025). The dashed lines represent trend growth rates, computed as Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trends of the respective YoY growth rates.<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p><strong>Figure 2<\/strong>\u00a0Euro area\u2013RoW trade and RER data<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Notes_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_euro_The_RER_is_measured_as_relative_GDP_deflators_and_expressed_as_a_percentage_deviation_from_its_2010_level\"><\/span><em>Notes<\/em>: A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the euro. The RER is measured as relative GDP deflators and expressed as a percentage deviation from its 2010 level.<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Despite this divergence, the euro area trade balance has remained consistently in surplus (Figure 2, panel b), and the euro area\u2013RoW real exchange rate has shown no clear trend over the same period (panel c). Meanwhile, euro area trade openness \u2013 measured as the sum of extra-euro area exports and imports over GDP \u2013 has doubled from 15% to 30% since 1999 (panel a). The RoW\u2019s relative trade openness has remained stable.<\/p>\n<p>These patterns raise two important questions: (1) How much of the euro area\u2019s trade surplus is due to weak productivity growth? And (2) why has the RER remained stable despite persistent productivity differentials?<\/p>\n<h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_model_with_trend_shocks\"><\/span>A model with trend shocks<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>To address these questions, we estimate a large-scale two-region model using euro area and RoW data from 1999 to 2023. The model incorporates both stationary and non-stationary shocks, including persistent shifts in productivity growth, trade preferences (captured through home bias parameters), and sector-specific export productivity. It also features standard frictions in price and wage adjustment, investment, and consumption habits, which allow for realistic short- and medium-term dynamics.<\/p>\n<p>A central innovation of our framework is the explicit modelling of trend shocks. This allows us to isolate the effects of trend shocks \u2013 such as persistent productivity differentials \u2013 from transitory disturbances. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods and matches a wide set of observed time series on output, trade, prices, and the real exchange rate.\n<\/p>\n<p>We then use the estimated model to generate historical shock decompositions for key macroeconomic variables. In our estimated model, the persistent weakness in euro area real GDP is largely explained by a sequence of negative shocks to euro area productivity growth, compounded by strong RoW growth. The divergence in trend growth paths explains much of the sustained output and income gap between the regions.<\/p>\n<h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_productivity_gap_as_a_driver_of_the_trade_balance_and_RER\"><\/span>The productivity gap as a driver of the trade balance and RER<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>Figure 3 breaks down the euro area trade balance and RER into contributions of key structural shocks. For the questions at hand, we highlight trend technology shocks in the euro area (blue) and the RoW (green), together with trade shocks (red). Any remaining disturbances are pooled as \u201cOthers\u201d (grey). The full paper also analyses additional shocks not shown here (notably euro area domestic demand shocks). The decomposition yields several important insights:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Our historical decomposition suggests that persistent productivity growth shocks account for between one quarter and one half of the observed euro area trade surplus. A positive trend productivity shock in RoW raises future income and wealth, prompting households and firms to increase consumption and investment in RoW. This generates a temporary boost in RoW demand for euro area exports and depresses RoW savings.<br \/>\n\u00a0The trade balance effects of adverse euro area growth shocks largely mirror the RoW shock as both widen the growth gap: weaker euro area productivity lowers expected returns and investment, leading to capital outflows and compressed imports. As a result, the euro area trade balance improves in the short to medium run (Figure 3a). Figure 4a illustrates this transmission mechanism through responses following a RoW growth shock.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Figure 3 Historical decompositions of euro area trade balance\/GDP and RER (downward movement = euro area appreciation)<\/p>\n<p>a) Euro area trade balance\/GDP<\/p>\n<p>b) Euro area RER<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Notes_The_coloured_bars_show_contributions_of_key_shocks_to_the_trade-balance-to-GDP_ratio_and_the_RER_solid_lines_show_the_data_Bars_above_the_solid_horizontal_line_represent_positive_shock_contributions_while_bars_below_show_negative_shock_contributions_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_euro\"><\/span><em>Notes<\/em>: The coloured bars show contributions of key shocks to the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio and the RER; solid lines show the data. Bars above the solid horizontal line represent positive shock contributions, while bars below show negative shock contributions. A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the euro.<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<ul>\n<li>However, this is not the full story since these shocks also affect the RER (Figure 3b). Standard theory predicts that faster <em>trend<\/em> productivity growth abroad should lead to a trend appreciation of the euro area RER.<br \/>\n\u00a0Yet, the data reveal a fairly \u2018flat\u2019 (medium-term) RER. This apparent puzzle can be explained by structural shifts in trade: a trend decline in euro area import prices, especially for non-commodity goods reflects faster productivity growth in RoW tradable sectors, notably in China and other emerging markets. This has reduced the relative price of foreign goods for European households and firms, increasing the euro area import share and mitigating appreciation pressures on the real exchange rate. At the same time, the euro area saw a secular reduction in home bias, with increased preference for foreign goods and euro area producers losing market share domestically. These developments are likely interconnected: higher productivity in RoW tradable sectors has been accompanied by improvements in product quality and variety, further deepening import penetration.<\/li>\n<li>Finally, the model offers insights into the external determinants of the domestic investment shortfall. Positive productivity shocks in the RoW not only boost foreign absorption but also raise global interest rates and relative returns abroad. In a context of financial openness, these developments reduce investment incentives within the euro area and crowd out domestic absorption. As such, the persistent weakness in euro area investment is not solely a reflection of internal demand shortfalls, but also of external structural forces operating through global capital markets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Figure 4<\/strong> Impulse response functions<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Notes_A_fall_in_the_euro_area_RER_represents_an_appreciation_of_the_Euro\"><\/span><em>Notes<\/em>: A fall in the euro area RER represents an appreciation of the Euro.<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Policy_implications\"><\/span>Policy implications<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>These findings carry implications for European policymakers. First, the persistent productivity growth gap between the euro area and the RoW is not only a concern for long-term convergence; addressing this productivity shortfall would likely help reduce the surplus, by strengthening domestic demand and attracting capital inflows. Improving financial conditions for startups, reducing regulatory burdens, and investing in skills should be top priorities for advancing this objective (Adilbish et al. 2025).<\/p>\n<p>Second, while short-run fiscal and monetary measures remain important tools for managing cyclical fluctuations, complementary reforms should aim at raising potential output. Our analysis shows that external imbalances reflect both cyclical and structural forces. A purely demand-based interpretation risks overlooking this.<\/p>\n<p>Third, these findings are timely, considering the ongoing policy debate around competitiveness. Draghi (2024) identifies low investment and weak productivity as major impediments to growth and calls for a renewed strategy to strengthen the supply side of the economy. Our results provide empirical support for this diagnosis. The estimated model suggests that persistent structural forces \u2013 rather than cyclical weakness alone \u2013 determine macroeconomic outcomes.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, our results show that external forces \u2013 such as faster growth in foreign productivity and shifts in global trade structures \u2013 exert a significant influence over European economic outcomes. This underscores the need for a coherent European strategy tackling both internal structural challenges and external developments.<\/p>\n<p><em>Authors\u2019 note: The views expressed in this column are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"References\"><\/span>References<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>Adilbish, O-E, D A Cerdeiro, R Duval, G H Hong, L Mazzone, L Rotunno, H Toprak and M Vaziri (2025), \u201cEurope\u2019s productivity weakness: Firm-level roots and remedies\u201d, VoxEU.org, 24 February.<\/p>\n<p>Backus, D, P Kehoe and F Kydland (1994), \u201cDynamics of the Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve?\u201d, <em>American Economic Review<\/em> 84: 84\u2013103.<\/p>\n<p>Bernanke, B S (2015), \u201cGermany\u2019s trade surplus is a problem\u201d, Brookings Institution Hutchins Centre, 3 April.<\/p>\n<p>Chen, R, G M Milesi-Ferretti and T Tressel (2013), \u201cExternal imbalances in the Eurozone\u201d, <em>Economic Policy <\/em>28(73): 101\u2013142.<\/p>\n<p>Demertzis, M (2024), \u201cSpend it at home: current account surpluses in the EU\u201d, Bruegel, 3 April.<\/p>\n<p>Draghi, M (2024), \u201cEurope: Back to Domestic Growth\u201d, CEPR Policy Insight No. 137, December.<\/p>\n<p>Fadinger, H, P Herkenhoff and J Schymik (2023), \u201cLessons from the Germany shock: Consequences of uncoordinated economic policies in a currency union\u201d, VoxEU.org, 10 September.<\/p>\n<p>Gopinath, G, \u015e Kalemli-\u00d6zcan, L Karabarbounis and C Villegas-S\u00e1nchez (2017), \u201cCapital Allocation and Productivity in South Europe\u201d, <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics <\/em>132(4): 1915\u20131967.<\/p>\n<p>IMF (2025), <em> Global Imbalances in a Shifting World<\/em>, External Sector Report, 22 July.<\/p>\n<p>Ifrim, A, R Kollmann, P Pfeiffer, M Ratto and W Roeger (2025), \u201cPersistent Global Growth Differences and Euro Area Adjustment: Real Activity, Trade and the Real Exchange Rate\u201d, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 20476.<\/p>\n<p>Jaccard, I and F Smets (2020), \u201cStructural asymmetries and financial imbalances in the Eurozone\u201d, <em>Review of Economic Dynamics <\/em>36: 73\u2013102.<\/p>\n<p>Kollmann, R, M Ratto, W Roeger, J in \u2018t Veld and L Vogel (2015), \u201cWhat drives the German current account? And how does it affect other EU member states?\u201d, <em>Economic Policy<\/em> 30(81): 47\u201393.<\/p>\n<p>Kollmann, R, B Pataracchia, R Raciborski, M Ratto, W Roeger and L Vogel (2016), \u201cThe post-crisis slump in the Euro Area and the US: Evidence from an estimated three-region DSGE model\u201d, <em>European Economic Review <\/em>88: 21\u201341.<\/p>\n<p>Kollmann, R, B Pataracchia, R Raciborski, M Ratto, W Roeger and L Vogel (2017), \u201cDrivers of the post-crisis slump in the Eurozone and the US\u201d, VoxEU.org, April 27.<\/p>\n<p>OECD (2025), <em>OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2025<\/em>, OECD Publishing.<\/p>\n<p>Ozhan, G K (2020), \u201cFinancial intermediation, resource allocation and macroeconomic interdependence\u201d, <em>Journal of Monetary Economics<\/em> 115: 265\u2013278.<\/p>\n<p>Reis, R, M McMahon, M Ellison, E Ilzetzki and W Den Haan (2016), \u201cThe danger of Germany\u2019s current account surpluses: Results of the CFM and CEPR Survey\u201d, VoxEU.org, 27 October.<\/p>\n<p>Sandbu, M (2024), \u201cHow to put Europe\u2019s savings to work\u201d, <em>Financial Times<\/em>, 21 November.<\/p>\n<p>Thesmar, D, X Ragot, A Roulet, M Kyle, P Martin, A Epaulard, S Jean, C Criscuolo, G Cette, L Boone, O Blanchard and A B\u00e9nassy-Qu\u00e9r\u00e9 (2019), \u201cProductivity and competitiveness in the euro area: A view from France\u201d, VoxEU.org, 24 July.<\/p>\n<p>World Bank (2025), World Development Indicators (WDI), Washington, DC.<\/p>\n<p>Zeugner, S and A Hobza (2013), \u201cCurrent-account surpluses in the Eurozone: Should they be reduced?\u201d, VoxEU.org, 26 April.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cepr.org\/voxeu\/columns\/europes-trade-surplus-international-relative-prices-and-productivity-growth-gap\"> Nuoroda \u012f informacijos \u0161altin\u012f <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since the early 2000s, the euro area has faced a persistent growth challenge. Output and productivity growth in the region have remained below those of global competitors such as the US and China. Over the same period, the euro area has maintained a sustained trade surplus, averaging 2.6% of GDP. This was accompanied by rising&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[3086,3243,205,1638,3242,2016,3241,3240,1406],"class_list":["post-1519","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-pasaulio-ekonomikos-naujienos","tag-europes","tag-gap","tag-growth","tag-international","tag-prices","tag-productivity","tag-relative","tag-surplus","tag-trade"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1519","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1519"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1519\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1519"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1519"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/naujienosversle.lt\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1519"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}